The statutory obstacle at the heart of the case traces back to Minnesota Statute § 609.341, Subd. 7. Under that specific provision, a person was classified as "mentally incapacitated", and therefore legally incapable of consent, only if an intoxicating substance was administered to them "without that person's agreement."
If a person willingly took shots at a bar or shared drinks at a house party and subsequently passed out or became incapacitated, prosecutors could not charge third-degree or fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct under the incapacity clauses. The legal burden required prosecutors to prove physical coercion or force under standard lack of consent statutes, an extraordinarily high evidentiary bar when conflicting accounts emerge from private residences without third-party eyewitnesses.
Defense attorneys statewide used this technicality for decades. Legal scholars and victim advocates had long pointed out that Minnesota lagged behind almost every other state in statutory protections for intoxicated victims. When Hennepin County prosecutors evaluated the evidence gathered from Steveson’s night in question, that narrow definition directly constrained their charging options.
